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ADVANCE DIRECTIVES TO 
WITHHOLD LIFE-SUSTAINING 
MEDICAL TREATMENT: ERODING 
AUTONOMY THROUGH STATUTORY 
REFORM  
LINDY WILLMOTT† 
I INTRODUCTION 
How an adult’s life comes to an end has been a topic of considerable public 
interest and scrutiny in recent times. In New South Wales, the Supreme Court 
refused to grant relief to the family of a 75 year old man, Isaac Messiha, who 
sought an order requiring the hospital to continue giving life support to him.1 In 
Victoria, the Civil and Administrative Tribunal appointed the Public Advocate to 
be guardian of Maria Korp; the Advocate later making a decision to withdraw her 
life-support.2 In the United States, after many years of legal dispute and, in the 
spotlight of the world media, life-support was withdrawn from Terri Schiavo.3 All 
of these cases generated a high level of public interest and debate on the question 
of when it is appropriate to stop such treatment. These cases may have been 
resolved more simply and with less controversy if the adult had completed an 
                                                          
†  LLB (Hons) (UQ), BCom (UQ), LLM (Cantab), Professor, Faculty of Law, Queensland 
University of Technology, part-time Member of Guardianship and Administration Tribunal. The 
views expressed in this article are those of the author only and not the bodies with which she is 
associated. The author thanks Michelle Howard and Dr Ben White for their comments and in 
developing some of the arguments raised in section V of this article. The author also thanks 
Professor Colleen Cartwright, Foundation Professor of Aged Services, Southern Cross University 
and Jim Cockerill for providing background context to the passage of the Queensland legislation. 
1  Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061. The 
application was for the Supreme Court to exercise its parens patriae to act in the best interests of 
an individual who is unable to care for or make decisions for himself or herself. The Court was 
not satisfied that the treatment proposed by the hospital, namely the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment, was not in the adult’s best interests. 
2  Korp (Guardianship) [2005] VCAT 779. 
3  The order to terminate Terri Shiavo’s life-prolonging medical procedures was ultimately made by 
a Guardianship Court: In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d. 176 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001). 
However, this decision was followed by various enactments and constitutional challenges of those 
enactments. For an overview of the legal issues that arose in the case, see Lindy Willmott, Ben 
White and Donna Cooper, ‘The Schiavo Decision: Emotional, But Legally Controversial?’ (2006) 
18 Bond Law Review 132. 
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advance directive: a document indicating the treatment that he or she would have 
wanted in such circumstances.  
A competent adult may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.4 However, 
the legal and ethical issues that surround refusal of treatment when an adult loses 
capacity to make decisions, are more complex. By the time an adult loses capacity 
to make a decision about medical treatment, he or she will be unable to advise 
health professionals of previously formed wishes. All jurisdictions in Australia 
facilitate the appointment of an individual to make a medical decision on behalf of 
an adult who lacks capacity.5 However, a decision by that individual may not 
necessarily accord with the adult’s previously expressed views or wishes. 
The completion of an advance directive about life-sustaining medical 
treatment is another option that is available to a competent adult who wants to 
refuse particular medical treatment (or give consent to that treatment), at some 
later stage in the future, should he or she become no longer competent to make 
such decisions. The common law recognises the right of a competent adult to 
make such a directive, as does the legislation, at least in some circumstances, in 
five of the eight Australian States and Territories.6 The common law continues to 
apply in the three jurisdictions that have not passed legislation.7 
Individuals who complete an advance directive about life-sustaining treatment 
are likely to do so in the belief that such a directive will be complied with by their 
doctor if capacity to make a decision about medical treatment is lost. While this is 
generally the position at common law, it may not be necessarily the case under the 
statutes that operate throughout Australia. In some jurisdictions, statutes only 
allow an advance directive about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment to operate if the person is sufficiently ill. The position is even more 
regulated in Queensland, as a further limitation applies in relation to directives to 
withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration: such a direction will only 
be effective if it would be inconsistent with ‘good medical practice’ to provide that 
treatment. 
The increasing importance to individuals in being able to make decisions 
about future medical treatment is reflected in the extent to which this topic has 
                                                          
4  Treatment that is needed to sustain or prolong life is commonly referred to as ‘life-sustaining 
medical treatment’. This sort of treatment includes procedures such as cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation, assisted ventilation and artificial nutrition and hydration. In Queensland, this 
treatment is referred to as a ‘life-sustaining measure’. When considering the Queensland 
legislation, the term ‘life-sustaining measure’ is used in this article. In other contexts, the terms 
‘life-sustaining treatment’ or ‘life-sustaining medical treatment’ will be used. 
5  Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic); Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW); Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) (‘GAA’); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (WA); 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA); Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 
(Tas); Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT); Adult Guardianship Act 
(NT). 
6  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld); Consent to Medical 
Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA); Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT); Natural 
Death Act 1988 (NT). 
7  See 4C below for an examination of the continued application of the common law in the statutory 
jurisdictions. 
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been on the government agenda throughout Australia. The legal regimes and/or 
policy guidelines on advance directives have either been reviewed recently or are 
currently under review in six of the eight Australian States and Territories.8 One of 
the challenges when contemplating statutory reform in relation to advance 
directives is the issue of what, if any, limits should be imposed on when they can 
operate. Subject to some limited conditions, the common law requires advance 
directives about medical treatment to be followed. Statutory schemes restrict the 
extent to which advance directives must be followed, by imposing conditions for 
validity, or operation. If these conditions are not met, health professionals are 
generally not required to comply with the directive. In developing a legislative 
regime about advance directives, law-makers must consider very complex and 
sensitive issues. An individual’s autonomy and, therefore, his or her right to 
choose not to receive certain medical treatment in the future must be balanced 
against the need to ensure that treatment is not withheld or withdrawn from an 
individual in inappropriate circumstances. As will be seen in this article, different 
jurisdictions take different approaches to achieve this balance.  
This article will focus on the Queensland legislation that regulates an advance 
directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. This 
jurisdiction is analysed in particular detail, because it imposes more restrictions on 
an individual’s ability to complete a binding and operative advance directive than 
any other Australian jurisdiction. As such, this law brings into sharp focus the 
tension between the principle of individual autonomy and the right to refuse 
medical treatment and, the state’s interest in preserving the life of its citizens. It is 
                                                          
8 Legislation facilitating completion of advance directives does not exist in New South Wales, so 
the common law governs issues of validity and scope of operation. In 2004, the New South Wales 
Department of Health developed a document entitled ‘Using Advance Care Directives’ which is 
designed to ‘provide advice to health professionals on the best practice use of advance care 
directives within an advance care planning process’: This document is available at: 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2004/ pdf/adcare_directive.pdf. Legislation also does not 
exist in Tasmania, but in 2005, a private member’s Bill, Directions for Medical Treatment Bill, 
was introduced into the Tasmanian Parliament. This Bill was not passed at the second reading 
speech stage on 21 June 2005 and has now lapsed. Western Australia does not yet have legislation 
about statutory advance directives. However, in May 2005, the Attorney-General and Minister for 
Health in Western Australia, Jim McGinty, published a Discussion Paper ‘Medical Treatment for 
the Dying’ that called for public submissions on an appropriate legal regime for advance 
directives. The Acts Amendment (Advance Health Care Planning) Bill 2006 (WA) has been 
drafted as a result of that review. This Bill was read for the second time in the Legislative Council 
on 6 December 2006. Review of existing statutes is also occurring in South Australia and the 
Northern Territory. In South Australia, an Advance Directives Review Issues Paper is currently 
being drafted and a Review Committee is being established by the South Australian Government. 
In March 2005, the Northern Territory, the Department of Health and Community Services 
released a Discussion Paper entitled ‘Review of Adult Guardianship within the Northern 
Territory’: http://www.nt.gov.au/health/org_supp/performance_audit/adult_guard/nt_guardian 
ship_review_discussion.doc [last accessed 15 December 2006]. The Paper considers the role of 
advance directives within the broader context of decision-making for individuals who lack 
capacity. In Queensland, the laws are being reviewed by the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission. The operation of advance directives is also of interest to many peak organisations. 
For example, in May 2006, Alzheimer’s Australia published Discussion Paper 8, ‘Decision 
making in advance: Reducing barriers and improving access to advance directives for people with 
dementia’, authored by Dr Margaret Brown, Research Fellow, Hawke Research Institute, 
University of South Australia. 
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also the only jurisdiction in which the laws are currently being reviewed by a Law 
Reform Commission. A reference to review existing guardianship laws was given 
to the Commission by the then Attorney-General, Linda Lavarch, in 2005. One 
aspect of the review is ‘the law relating to the withholding and withdrawal of 
life-sustaining measures’. This will require, among other things, a consideration of 
advance directives and their operation within the context of withholding or 
withdrawing treatment. 
The article will compare the legal frameworks both at common law and under 
the State and Territory legislation. The proposals for change being contemplated 
by the Western Australian government will also be considered. The article 
critiques the Queensland legislation and suggests that its restrictions on the 
operation of an advance directive unjustifiably infringe a competent adult’s right 
to determine medical treatment and that the Queensland Law Reform Commission 
(‘QLRC’) should recommend reform to abolish many of those restrictions. 
Conclusions reached in this article about the appropriate balance between 
autonomy on the one hand and, sanctity of life, on the other, in the context of the 
Queensland legislation, are equally relevant to the numerous reviews on this issue 
occurring throughout Australia. 
II ADVANCE HEALTH DIRECTIVES IN 
QUEENSLAND 
In Queensland, an adult may complete an advance health directive (‘AHD’) about 
the health care that he or she wants or does not want to receive at some time in the 
future if he or she loses capacity to make such decisions.9 The Powers of Attorney 
Act 1998 (Qld) governs the requisite capacity that an adult must possess to 
complete an AHD, formal requirements with which an AHD must comply and, the 
circumstances in which an AHD that relates to withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining measures, can operate. The legislation also addresses whether the 
common law regime regarding advance directives will continue to operate 
alongside the statutory regime.  
                                                          
9  A variety of terms is used to describe the instructions about health care that are given by an adult 
in advance of his or her loss of capacity and intended to operate after capacity is lost. The term 
used in the Queensland legislation is ‘advance health directive’: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) ch 3 pt 3. This is also the term proposed under the Acts Amendment (Advance Health Care 
Planning) Bill 2006 (WA) pt 9B. Other terms used include ‘refusal of treatment certificate’: 
Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5, a ‘direction’ (to refuse or for the withdrawal of medical 
treatment): Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 3 and pt 2 div 2.1 and Natural Death Act 1988 
(NT) or an ‘anticipatory direction’ (to grant or refuse consent to medical treatment): Consent to 
Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) ss 4 and 7. 
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A When is an AHD to Withdraw or Withhold a Life-Sustaining 
Measure Valid? 
For an AHD to be valid, the adult must have capacity at the time it is executed 
and, the relevant provisions regarding formality, must be complied with. The 
position regarding capacity is complex. First, the adult must possess the requisite 
capacity. A person is regarded as having capacity for a matter if he or she is 
capable of understanding the nature and effect of decisions, can freely and 
voluntarily make decisions and can communicate the decision in some way.10 This 
definition relates to matters generally under the legislation. The second relevant 
provision specifically addresses the capacity that an adult must have to complete 
an AHD. Pursuant to s 42, an adult can make an AHD only if he or she 
understands the following matters: 
(a) the nature and likely effects of each direction in the advance health 
directive; 
(b) a direction operates only while the principal has impaired capacity for the 
matter covered by the direction; 
(c) the principal may revoke a direction at any time the principal has capacity 
for the matter covered by the direction; 
(d) at any time the principal is not capable of revoking a direction, the principal 
is unable to effectively oversee the implementation of the direction.11 
The Queensland legislation is not entirely clear about how this provision 
interrelates with the definition of ‘capacity’ in schedule 3. It is submitted that s 42 
sets out a non-exhaustive list of matters that an adult must be able to understand to 
meet the test of ‘capacity’ that is set out in the schedule 3 definition.12 
In addition to having the requisite capacity, the AHD must satisfy the formal 
requirements of the legislation. The AHD must be in writing and may be in the 
approved form.13 It must be signed by the adult14 and signed and dated by an 
eligible witness.15 The witness must certify that the AHD was signed in the 
witness’s presence and, at the time the adult signed, he or she appeared to have the 
capacity necessary to make the AHD.16 An AHD must also include a certificate 
that is signed and dated by a doctor; the certificate attesting to the fact that, at the 
                                                          
10  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 3 definition of ‘capacity’. 
11  If the adult also uses the AHD to appoint an attorney to make health care decisions on the adult’s 
behalf, then he or she must also have the necessary capacity to complete an enduring power of 
attorney: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) ss 42(2), 41. 
12  For further discussion of this point, see Lindy Willmott, Ben White and Michelle Howard, 
‘Refusing Advance Refusals: Advance Directives and Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ (2006) 
30 Melbourne University Law Review 211. 
13  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(2). 
14  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3)(a)(i). Note that if the adult is unable to sign the 
document, the legislation makes provision for the AHD to be signed by an ‘eligible signer’ under 
the instruction of the adult: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3)(a)(ii). 
15  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3)(b). 
16  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(4).   
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time the adult made the AHD, he or she appeared to the doctor to have the 
necessary capacity to complete the document.17 
B When Can an AHD about Withholding or Withdrawing a 
Life-Sustaining Measure Operate? 
The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) provides that an adult may give directions 
about ‘health matters’ and ‘special health matters’ in an AHD.18 A ‘health matter’ 
is defined to be ‘a matter relating to health care, other than special health care’ of 
the adult.19 The legislation then defines health care in very broad terms.20 Part of 
that definition deals specifically with life-sustaining measures: 
(2) Health care … includes withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining 
measure for the principal if the commencement or continuation of the 
measure for the principal would be inconsistent with good medical 
practice.21 
This means that a direction in an AHD can include a direction about withholding 
or withdrawing a life-sustaining measure. For example, an adult may direct in such 
a document that he or she does not wish to receive cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
even if such a measure may be required to keep the adult alive.  
Generally speaking, an AHD that complies with the formal requirements of 
the legislation and is completed by an adult with the requisite capacity must be 
followed. Thus the health professional must follow a direction set out in an AHD, 
or risk committing an offence under the legislation.22 
However, where a direction in an AHD relates to the withholding or 
withdrawing of a life-sustaining measure, the legislation imposes restrictions on its 
operation. The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) provides that such a direction 
cannot operate unless two or three conditions are met, depending on the 
circumstances.23 The first condition is that the adult’s health must be sufficiently 
poor and the legislation requires the adult to fall within one of four categories. The 
adult must: 
 have a terminal illness (or a condition that is incurable or irreversible) from 
which the adult is expected to die within a year; 
                                                          
17  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(6).  
18  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 35(1)(a). 
19  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 4. ‘Special health care’ is defined in Powers of 
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 7 as health care of the following types: (a) removal of tissue for 
donation to someone else; (b) sterilisation; (c) termination of pregnancy; (d) participation in 
special medical research or experimental health care; (e) electroconvulsive therapy or 
psychosurgery; and (f) prescribed health care.  
20  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 5(1). 
21  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 5(2). 
22  GAA ss 79 and 66. Note, however, there are excuses under s 103 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) that are available to health professionals who do not comply with an AHD. For a detailed 
examination of these excuses and excuses that apply at common law and in other Australian 
jurisdictions, see Willmott, White and Howard, above n 12. 
23  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2). 
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 be in a persistent vegetative state; 
 be permanently unconscious; or 
 have an illness or injury of such severity that there is no reasonable prospect 
that the adult will recover to an extent that life-sustaining measures will not be 
needed. 
The second condition is that the AHD can only apply if the adult has no 
reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed to make decisions about his 
or her health. 
The third condition applies only if the AHD is being relied upon to refrain 
from providing artificial nutrition and hydration. In these circumstances, the 
directive will only operate if the commencement or continuation of this treatment 
would be inconsistent with good medical practice. 
C Preservation of the Common Law Regime 
Five Australian jurisdictions have enacted legislation that facilitates an adult 
completing an advance directive for health care. In most of these jurisdictions, the 
common law regime regarding advance directives, continues to apply.24 This 
means that a two-tier system will operate. An adult can choose to give an advance 
directive which, if valid at common law, will govern future treatment. 
Alternatively, the adult may choose to comply with the formal requirements of the 
relevant legislative regime so that his or her instructions will be regulated by 
statute.  
As outlined above, the Queensland legislation establishes a comprehensive 
process whereby the adult makes decisions about the treatment that he or she may 
wish to receive or not receive at some future time. Although the legislation 
establishes a comprehensive statutory regime, the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) specifically recognises the common law scheme governing advance 
directives. Section 39 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) states: ‘[t]his Act 
does not affect common law recognition of instructions about health care given by 
an adult that are not given in an advance health directive.’ 
Despite the clear attempt to retain this aspect of the common law, it is 
suggested that s 66 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) 
(‘GAA’) precludes its recognition. Section 66(1) of the GAA states: ‘[i]f an adult 
has impaired capacity for a health matter, the matter may only be dealt with under 
the first of the following subsections to apply (emphasis added).’  
                                                          
24  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 4; Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 5; Natural Death 
Act 1988 (NT) s 5. The South Australian legislation is silent about the effect of the legislation on 
the common law, but in the absence of a provision to the contrary, the common law rights would 
continue to apply. This proposition is supported by C Stewart in ‘The Australian Experience of 
Advance Directives and Possible Future Directions’ (2005) 24 Special Supplement Edition of the 
Australasian Journal on Ageing s 25.  
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The subsections that follow do not include directives that are recognised at 
common law. The words ‘may only be dealt with’ are absolutely clear: the sources 
of decision-making in relation to health care are to be found only in this section. 
Instructions about health care given previously by the adult that would be 
recognised as binding at common law are not mentioned in s 66, so while they 
may be relevant in guiding decision-makers, they cannot compel a particular 
outcome.25 It could be argued that the specific words of s 39 might prevail over the 
more general words of s 66. However, s 8 of the GAA and s 6A(4) of the Powers 
of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) specifically provide that, in the case of inconsistency 
between the two Acts, the GAA should prevail. The result is that a common law 
advance directive given by an adult in Queensland will not be binding on health 
professionals. The significant implications of this exclusion are considered in 
Section V of the article. 
III ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AT COMMON LAW 
This section of the article examines the status of advance directives at common 
law. Although there is a relative dearth of case law that directly considers this 
issue, the common law, both in Australia and overseas, seems to recognise the 
right of an adult to refuse life-sustaining measures in advance of losing capacity.  
For a common law advance directive to withdraw or withhold a life-sustaining 
measure to operate, it must be valid and the adult must have intended it to apply to 
the situation that ultimately arose. On the rare occasions that such cases are 
judicially considered, it is clear that the courts are rigorous in their efforts to 
ensure both the validity of the directive and the adult’s intention that it would 
operate in specific circumstances.  
A Recognition of Advance Directives to Withdraw or Withhold 
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment 
The common law recognises that, in some circumstances, an adult can complete an 
advance directive that will operate at a future time when the adult no longer has 
capacity to make decisions about health care. Further, that directive may relate to 
life-sustaining medical treatment. 
This right has been acknowledged on a number of occasions and the law is 
now regarded as settled in many common law jurisdictions.26 While no Australian 
                                                          
25  For a more detailed examination of why common law directives will not apply following the 
enactment of the Queensland statutes, see Ben White and Lindy Willmott, ‘Will You Do As I 
Ask?’ (2004) 4 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 77. 
26  R (on the application of Burke) v The General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin) 
(although note that the Court of Appeal suggested caution in relying on aspects of Munby J’s 
judgment in future cases: [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 [24]); HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 
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case has directly ruled on whether an advance directive is an effective legal tool 
for giving advance consent to, or refusal of, treatment, it is generally thought that 
this would be the case. This assertion can be made for a number of reasons. First, 
Australian statutes that create a statutory regime for refusing treatment in advance, 
generally assume this to be the case.27 Secondly, although not forming part of the 
ratio decidendi of the decision, the Victorian Court of Appeal in 1998 seemed to 
accept that a common law advance directive would be binding on health 
professionals.28 Thirdly, academic and other literature in Australia assume the 
effectiveness of advance directives as a mechanism to direct future treatment.29 
B When Will an Advance Directive to Withdraw or Withhold 
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment be Valid? 
There are only two requirements for an advance directive to be valid at common 
law: firstly the adult must be competent to give the directive and second, the adult 
must have acted without undue influence in giving or making that directive.30 
These requirements also apply to directives about life-sustaining medical 
treatment. 
The requirement of competence has two limbs: the adult must have capacity at 
the time the directive is given; and must be able to communicate that directive in 
some way.31 In making an assessment about capacity in the context of decisions 
about medical treatment, the level of capacity that must be demonstrated depends 
                                                                                                                                     
EWHC 1017 (Fam); Re AK (medical treatment: consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129; Re C (adult: refusal 
of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 860, 
866, 892; Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 653, 662-663, 665-666, 
669; Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321; Werth v Taylor (1991) 475 NW 2d 426. 
27  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 39, Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 4, Medical 
Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 5, Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 5. 
28  Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 (the High Court refusing 
special leave to appeal (Qumsieh v Pilgrim M98/1998 (29 October 1999, 11 February 2000)). For 
a discussion of this case, see Cameron Stewart, ‘Qumsieh’s Case, Civil Liability and the Right to 
Refuse Medical Treatment’ (2000) 8 Journal of Law and Medicine 56. 
29  Authors of health law texts and scholarly articles frequently look to the common law on advance 
directives in overseas jurisdictions as representative of the likely position in Australia and tend to 
assume that the common law on advance directives would apply: see, for example, Ian Kerridge, 
Michael Lowe and John McPhee, Ethics and law for the Health Professionals (2nd ed, 2005) 191, 
199; Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice (2nd ed, 2004) 107, 157; Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-Making by and for People with a 
Decision-Making Disability, Report No 49 (1996) Volume 1, 348, 357; ‘Medical Treatment for 
the Dying’ Discussion Paper issued by the Western Australian Attorney-General and Minister for 
Health, May 2005, p 4.  
30  Some authors suggest that, in addition, the adult must also have intended the directive to apply to 
the situation that ultimately took place, and that the directive given must be based on sufficient 
information: Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law (3rd ed, 2000) 2037. It is submitted, 
however, that the former requirement relates to operation of the directive rather than validity, and 
that validity of an advance directive at common law does not turn on the sufficiency of 
information that the adult had before making the directive. For a more detailed discussion of the 
latter point, see Willmott, White and Howard, above n 12, 220–21.  
31  R (on the application of Burke) v The General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin) at 
[41]. 
 FLINDERS JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM [(2007) 
10 
on the treatment. If the consequences of the decision are grave, such as a decision 
to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure, the level of competence 
required is commensurately high.32 The same principles apply when considering 
an adult’s capacity to make a directive in advance of treatment being necessary. 
‘Capacity’ has recently been defined as follows: Essentially capacity is 
dependent upon having the ability, whether or not one chooses to use it, to 
function rationally: having the ability to understand, retain, believe and evaluate 
(ie, process) and weigh the information which is relevant to the subject-matter.33 
Secondly, the directive must have been the result of an independent exercise 
of the adult’s free will. If the directive was given as a result of undue influence 
being exerted on the adult by someone else, the directive would be invalid.34 In 
such cases, the adult will be regarded as not having made a decision and, at 
common law, the health professional is legally able to make a decision about the 
adult’s medical treatment based on his or her view of the best interests of the 
patient.35  
C When Will an Advance Directive Operate? 
Validity is not the only condition for an advance directive to operate. A directive 
will only govern the medical treatment to be given if the adult intended the 
directive to apply in the circumstances that ultimately arose.36 For example, if an 
adult indicated to a health professional that he or she did not want to be kept alive 
by extraordinary measures if he or she were in the end stages of a terminal illness, 
that directive would not prevent cardiopulmonary resuscitation being given to the 
same adult who did not have a terminal illness but suffered a heart attack. In the 
example given, the adult would not have intended the directive to operate in these 
circumstances and, as such, although legally valid (because the adult was 
                                                          
32 Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, 472 and Re T (adult: refusal of 
medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649,  661. In the former case, it was held that the woman had 
sufficient capacity to make the decision to withdraw artificial ventilation. For comment about the 
standard of capacity required for such decisions, see J Manning, ‘Autonomy and The Competent 
Patient’s Right To Refuse Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment — Again’ (2002) 10 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 239 and M Parker, ‘Judging Capacity: Paternalism and The Risk-Related 
Standard’ (2004) 11 Journal Law of Medicine 482. 
33  R (on the application of Burke) v The General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin). 
For other judicial pronouncements on this test, see also Re C (adult: refusal of medial treatment) 
[1994] 1 All ER 819, Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 and Re B (adult: refusal of 
medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
34  Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649. In this case, the English Court of 
Appeal held that undue influence had been exerted on a woman who was 34 weeks pregnant and 
made an advance directive refusing a blood transfusion by her mother. In the course of his 
judgment, Straughton LJ distinguished between legitimate influence that is commonly exerted on 
adults by family members with ‘undue’ influence which effectively persuades the adult to depart 
from his or her own will: [1992] 4 All ER 649, 669. 
35  Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 664. 
36  See, for example, Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 662-663 
(Donaldson MR), 668 (Butler-Sloss LJ) and 669 (Staughton LJ). 
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competent and there was no undue influence), the directive would not have been 
operative in the legal sense.  
D Judicial Approach to Advance Directives about Withholding 
and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Measures 
Although the law recognises an adult’s right to self-determination, in the context 
of an adult’s desire to refuse a life-sustaining measure, the judiciary frequently 
comments on the tension between this right and society’s legitimate interest in the 
sanctity of life and the need to preserve life wherever possible. This tension was 
graphically illustrated in Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment)37 where a 
41 year old tetraplegic woman wanted to refuse artificial ventilation. Her medical 
team disagreed as they wanted her to try other treatment options and so refused to 
follow her direction. Although Butler-Sloss P found that the refusal to follow the 
directions of Ms B was unlawful and that treatment should have been stopped, the 
President noted the tension between the principle of autonomy and the concerns 
raised by society and the medical profession to guard the ‘equally fundamental 
principle of the sanctity of life’.38 Despite this tension, it is clearly established that 
an adult’s right to self-determination prevails over the principle of sanctity of 
life.39  
That said, the judiciary is very cautious before it concludes that an advance 
directive to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure will operate.40 This 
caution is evidenced in two ways. First, a court is cautious in its assessment of the 
validity of an advance directive,41 whether it was intended to extend to the 
situation that occurred,42 and whether it continues to operate.43 In determining 
                                                          
37  [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
38  Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, 456.  
39  Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, 457 citing Lord Mustill in 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 891 and Lord Donaldson in Re T (adult: refusal of 
medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661.  
40  For a further discussion of judicial approaches to proof in the context, see also Willmott, White 
and Howard, above n 12, 236–37. 
41  See, for example, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re T (adult: refusal of medical 
treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649. Despite relatively clear declarations by the adult that she did not 
want to be treated with blood products, and the fact that such a directive was consistent with her 
upbringing by her mother who was a Jehovah’s Witness, the Court held that the adult did not 
have capacity at the time she made the directive. At the time, the adult’s will was held to be 
overborne by that of her mother’s. 
42  Again, Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 is illustrative. The case 
was decided on the basis that the adult’s refusal was not valid as she was subject to undue 
influence. Two of the Justices also indicated that the scope of the refusal may not have operated 
to provide an effective refusal: [1992] 4 All ER 649, 662-63 (Donaldson MR), 668 (Butler-Sloss 
LJ). As there was evidence that there may have been a satisfactory alternative to blood products, 
any refusal of blood products by the adult may be limited to a case where there was a satisfactory 
alternative treatment. See also Werth v Taylor (1991) 475 NW 2d 426 where the Michigan Court 
of Appeals held that a ‘Refusal to Permit Blood Transfusion’ form was completed in 
contemplation of routine elective surgery rather then in the context of life-threatening 
circumstances. As such, it did not represent a refusal that was binding on health professionals. 
Compare, however, Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
 FLINDERS JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM [(2007) 
12 
these matters, the court will err on the side of caution and any doubt will be 
resolved ‘in favour of the preservation of life’44 by not upholding the advance 
directive. If the public interest in preserving the sanctity of life is to be overridden, 
the direction must be in clear terms.45  
Secondly, the Family Division of the English High Court has recently taken 
an interesting approach to the issue of ‘onus of proof’ which, from a practical 
perspective, may limit the extent to which an advance directive refusing 
life-sustaining treatment is likely to be accepted by courts as representing the 
current views of the adult. HE v A Hospital Trust46 involved a 24 year old woman 
who was born and brought up a Muslim, but who later became a Jehovah’s 
Witness. The woman completed an advance directive stating that she did not want 
to receive blood or primary blood components. The advance directive also 
provided that it could only be directly revoked in writing. Just over two years later, 
the woman became ill and needed a blood transfusion to save her life. Since 
completing the advance directive, the woman had become betrothed to a Muslim 
man, had stated that she would become a Muslim again and had stopped attending 
Jehovah’s Witness meetings. Munby J held that the advance directive had ceased 
to operate as the woman would not have intended it to apply in the changed 
circumstances. Also, the provision limiting the way in which the directive could be 
altered was void as it was contrary to public policy. This decision is not surprising 
as circumstances had changed since the time the advance directive was completed. 
What is surprising, is Munby J’s comment about the onus and burden of proof. In 
his view, the burden of proving the existence, continuing validity and applicability 
of an advance directive lies with those seeking to rely on it. Further, the standard 
of proof must be ‘clear and convincing proof’.  
If an adult takes the necessary steps to complete an advance directive that 
details the treatment that he or she does not want to receive, it is difficult to find a 
rational basis to require another individual to provide clear and convincing proof 
that such a directive continues to be in existence and is still valid and applicable. 
The adult prepared the advance directive to provide just that proof. If the advance 
directive appears on its face to be valid and to apply to the situation that arose, a 
more sensible approach would be for the onus of proof to shift to those individuals 
who claim that the directive is no longer valid or applicable. This approach would 
be more consistent with accepted views about self-determination and autonomy.  
                                                                                                                                     
43  See, for example, Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 where he 
commented that ‘especial care may be necessary to ensure that the prior refusal or consent is still 
properly to be regarded as applicable in the circumstances which have subsequently arisen’. 
44  HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam), [47]; Re T (adult: refusal of medical 
treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661.  
45  Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661. 
46  [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam). 
10 FJLR ?] LINDY WILLMOTT 
13 
IV ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN OTHER 
STATUTORY JURISDICTIONS  
Queensland is one of five jurisdictions in Australia that regulate directives about 
future health care. Legislation also exists in Victoria,47 South Australia,48 the 
Australian Capital Territory49 and the Northern Territory.50 The Western 
Australian Government is also reviewing the law on medical treatment for the 
dying and is considering whether the right to make an advance directive should be 
statutorily enshrined.51 A Bill has been drafted and awaits enactment.52 A Bill, 
largely modelled on the South Australian legislation, was introduced into the 
Tasmanian Parliament in 2005 but has since lapsed.53 The statutes (and proposed 
statutes) vary significantly in their scope and operation, but all allow an adult, at 
least in some circumstances, to complete a directive refusing life-sustaining 
medical treatment at a future time when that adult no longer has the capacity to 
make decisions.  
A When is an Advance Directive to Withdraw or Withhold 
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment Valid? 
The statutes in the other statutory jurisdictions have equivalent validity 
requirements to those that exist in Queensland. First, the adult must be of sound 
mind at the time the advance directive is completed.54 Second, the adult must have 
completed the advance directive in the absence of undue influence or other 
vitiating factors.55 The various statutes approach these requirements in different 
ways. The Victorian legislation requires the witness to an advance directive to 
attest that the adult completed the directive ‘voluntarily and without inducement or 
compulsion’,56 while the Australian Capital Territory statute provides that an 
advance directive will be void if it is obtained through the use of ‘violence, threats, 
                                                          
47 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic). 
48  Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA). 
49  Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT). 
50  Natural Death Act 1988 (NT). 
51  ‘Medical Treatment for the Dying’ Discussion Paper issued by the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Health, May 2005. 
52 Acts Amendment (Advance Health Care Planning) Bill 2006 (WA). 
53 Directions for Medical Treatment Bill 2005 (Tas). As this Bill has now lapsed, it will not be 
considered in this review of Australian legislation. 
54  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(d); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care 
Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1); Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 6; Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) 
s 4(1). The Western Australian Bill requires the adult to have ‘full legal capacity: the Acts 
Amendment (Advance Health Care Planning) Bill 2006 (WA) s 11 inserting s 110Q into the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990. 
55  This can be compared with the Queensland approach where the ability of the adult to make a 
directive ‘freely and voluntarily’ was a limb of the definition of capacity, rather than a separate 
requirement for validity of the directive: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 3 definition of 
capacity. 
56  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(b).  
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intimidation, or a person otherwise hinders or interferes with the adult for the 
purpose of obtaining a directive’.57 The Western Australian Bill requires the 
treatment decision in the directive to be made voluntarily and not as a result of 
inducement or coercion.58 The legislative provisions in South Australia and the 
Northern Territory are silent on the effect of an advance directive completed as a 
result of undue influence. In those jurisdictions, it is likely that common law 
principles will apply and that such an advance directive would not be regarded as 
being valid. In addition, the advance directive would need to comply with the 
relevant formality requirements such as signing the document by the adult and 
witnesses. In some jurisdictions, the witness needs to attest to the fact that the 
adult possessed the requisite capacity to sign the advance directive,59 while in 
others, the attestation relates only to the fact that the adult signed the document.60 
B When Will an Advance Directive about Withholding or 
Withdrawing a Life-Sustaining Measure Operate? 
In most of these jurisdictions, there are some restrictions about when an advance 
directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment can be made, or will 
operate. In broad terms, the statutes set out two kinds of restrictions regarding 
advance refusal of treatment. The first restriction is that a directive to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment will only operate if the adult is suffering from a particular 
condition (Victoria),61 or is sufficiently ill (South Australia62 and the Northern 
Territory)63. This restriction exists in all of the statutory jurisdictions except the 
Australian Capital Territory (and the legislation proposed in Western Australia), 
and is similar to that described as applying in Queensland. 
The second restriction exists only in Victoria. In that State, the adult must be 
suffering from a particular condition or illness before he or she can complete a 
certificate refusing specified treatment.64  
                                                          
57  Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 19(2). 
58  Acts Amendment (Advance Health Care Planning) Bill 2006 (WA) s 11 inserting s 110R(1) into 
the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990. 
59  Victoria: Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1) and South Australia: Consent to Medical 
Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2) and Consent to Medical Treatment and 
Palliative Regulation 2004 (SA) sch 1. 
60  Australian Capital Territory: Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 7(c)-(d) and sch 1 form 1; 
Northern Territory: Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4(2) and Natural Death Regulations (NT) reg 
2 and sch; Western Australia: Acts Amendment (Advance Health Care Planning) Bill 2006 (WA) 
s 11 inserting s 110Q(1) into the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990. 
61  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1). 
62  Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1). 
63  Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s (4)(1). 
64  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1). 
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C Preservation of the Common Law Regime 
The statutory regimes in Victoria, South Australia, the Australian Capital 
Territory, the Northern Territory and that proposed in Western Australia differ 
from Queensland’s statute in an important respect. The common law regime 
regarding advance directives continues to apply notwithstanding the enactment of 
a statutory regime for the advance refusal of medical treatment. This is expressly 
stated to be the case in Victoria,65 the Australian Capital Territory,66 the Northern 
Territory67 and Western Australia.68 Although the South Australian legislation is 
silent on this point, it is submitted that the rights that existed at common law prior 
to the enactment of the legislation, namely the right to complete a binding advance 
directive, would remain unless that right were expressly abolished.69  
This means that a two-tier system operates in these jurisdictions. An adult can 
choose to give an advance directive which, if valid at common law, will govern 
future treatment. Alternatively, the adult may choose to comply with the formal 
requirements of the relevant legislative regime so that his or her instructions will 
be regulated by statute.  
V CRITIQUE OF LEGISLATIVE REGULATION 
OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES: A STATUTORY 
CASE STUDY 
The introduction of a legislative regime of advance directives necessarily imposes 
limitations on an individual’s ability to refuse future treatment. At common law, 
an individual is entitled to make any directive about future treatment. In the 
absence of vitiating factors, that directive must be followed by a health 
professional if the contemplated medical situation later arises. A legislative regime 
limits an individual’s right to make a binding directive. At the very least, a statute 
prescribes formality obligations about signing, witnessing and, in some cases, the 
use of prescribed forms. Most jurisdictions also impose conditions about when the 
directive can operate. 
There are also advantages in a legislative regime. First, the formality 
obligations provide a degree of certainty for health professionals who are relying 
on the directive to guide treatment decisions. A document that is signed by the 
adult and witnessed by another person, at least, provides evidence that the 
                                                          
65  Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 4. 
66  Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 5. 
67  Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 5. 
68  Acts Amendment (Advance Health Care Planning) Bill 2006 (WA) s 11 inserting s 110ZB into the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990. 
69  See above, n 24.  
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directive was given by the adult. In some jurisdictions, witnesses also attest to the 
capacity of the adult. Where the directive relates to withholding or withdrawing a 
life-sustaining measure, it is crucial for health professionals to be confident that 
the directive represented the views of the adult and, that the adult had capacity, 
when making the directive. This certainty is more likely to be achieved where 
there are signing and witnessing requirements.  
Secondly, a formal advance directive regime encourages an individual to 
consciously focus on the medical decisions that may need to be made in the future. 
This is particularly so in those jurisdictions that have prescribed forms that may or 
must be used and which detail what type of medical decisions might need to be 
considered. By contrast, common law directives may simply be oral statements 
made by the adult and not necessarily in the context of a serious discussion about 
medical treatments that the adult wanted to receive or not receive in specified 
future circumstances.  
Thirdly, formal directives may provide comfort to family and friends of the 
adult, when the adult no longer has capacity to make medical decisions and, a 
decision needs to be made, about a life-sustaining treatment. Knowing that the 
adult had given treatment decisions careful consideration may relieve loved ones 
of some pressure during a period of crisis. They are aware of the treatment that the 
adult wants to receive or wants to refuse. In the absence of a formal directive, 
family and friends may be required to relay previous utterances of the adult to 
health professionals. An assessment would then have to be made about the 
certainty and reliability of previous statements. This difficult process could be 
avoided if the adult’s wishes were expressed in a more formal way. 
When governments consider whether to introduce a statutory regime to 
replace or supplement the common law, they must balance these advantages 
against the disadvantages, namely, the restrictions imposed by legislation that 
affect both validity and operation of the directive. Some legislative restrictions 
may be desirable. The formality requirements are designed to ensure that the 
directive was indeed given by the adult and represented his or her wishes at the 
time. The restrictions about when an advance directive can operate, however, are 
different in nature and cannot be justified on these grounds. These restrictions 
effectively impinge on an individual’s previously held common law right to refuse 
treatment in any circumstance. They are imposed because state interest in 
preserving life, and in ensuring medical treatment is only withheld in situations 
that might be regarded as appropriate by the community, such as when an adult is 
in the terminal phase of an illness.  
Queensland’s restricted treatment of advance directives raises significant 
issues. Additional criteria to the widely endorsed requirements of capacity and 
formality compliance — a sufficiently poor state of health, lack of prospects of 
recovering capacity and, inconsistency with good medical practice — mark 
Queensland’s legislation as the most restrictive in Australia. 
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Although the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) is largely based on 
recommendations made by the QLRC in its final report,70 the Commission 
abstained from making a recommendation about how decisions regarding life-
sustaining treatment should be made. While concluding that the ‘state of the law in 
this area is unsatisfactory and should be comprehensively reviewed’,71 the 
Commission also stated that this issue involved much wider moral and ethical 
dilemmas and required extensive public consultation and debate. As such, no 
recommendations were made. The restrictions therefore are not based on 
recommendations of the QLRC. Further, the original Bill that was introduced into 
Parliament in 1997 did not contain the current limitations set out in the legislation 
and discussed in this article. These amendments were introduced into the Bill at 
the Committee stage in 1998. It appears the Bill was amended as a result of 
pressure exerted from lobby groups. The problem is that there is no examination of 
these restrictions in the explanatory memorandum to the Bill and very little in the 
Parliamentary debate as recorded in Hansard.72 When discussing the amendments 
during the Parliamentary debate, the then Attorney-General, Mr Beanland, stated 
the following: ‘[a]n advance health directive enables a person to make the same 
sort of decisions in advance of his or her losing capacity that he or she could have 
made previously.’ 
In the context of a directive about withholding and withdrawing a 
life-sustaining measure, this statement is misleading. The amendments made at the 
Committee stage significantly restrict the previously held right of a person to 
dictate future treatment. The Attorney-General did not acknowledge that an AHD 
could only operate in more limited circumstances than dictated at common law, 
nor explain why the amendments to insert the limitations, were necessary73 
This section of the article critiques the legislation in Queensland. This 
jurisdiction was chosen because it contains the greatest restrictions on when an 
advance directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment can 
operate. The analysis that follows is of the kind that will need to be undertaken by 
the QLRC when reviewing the Queensland law. As we have seen, the law in many 
other jurisdictions is currently being reviewed in this area. Many of the issues 
raised are ones that will have to be grappled with by all of the reviews in the other 
Australian States and Territories.  
                                                          
70  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-Making By 
and For People With a Decision-Making Disability, Report No 49 (1996) vol 1, 321. 
71  Ibid. 
72 For the brief discussion of this amendment, see Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 12 May 1997, 1019–020 (Denver Beanland). 
73  There was one explanation provided, but this related to only one aspect of the limitations inserted 
by the amendments. The Attorney-General noted that the amendments would ‘guard against the 
possibility, remote though it may be, of a person attempting to give a direction for the refusal of 
life-sustaining measures in a situation in which the person’s health can be restored by simple 
medical procedures’: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 May 1997, 
1020 (Denver Beanland).  
 FLINDERS JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM [(2007) 
18 
A Comparison with Common Law Regime 
Both the common law and the Queensland statute attempt to balance the principles 
of self-determination and sanctity of life by limiting the circumstances in which an 
adult’s advance directive to withhold or refuse a life-sustaining measure can be 
followed. As evidenced earlier in the article, they do this in very different ways. 
At common law, an advance directive can operate only if it is valid. The 
courts scrutinise the circumstances of each case very carefully to ensure that the 
adult possessed the requisite competence and that undue influence had not been 
exercised. Further, the courts go to great lengths to satisfy themselves that a 
previously given directive is valid, still represents the views of the adult and that 
the directive was intended by the adult to govern the medical situation that 
ultimately arose. Once satisfied of these matters, there is no further limitation on 
when a directive to refuse a life-sustaining measure will operate. It is irrelevant 
that the adult would have lived for an extended time or even made a full recovery 
if the life-sustaining measure were given, or that the adult was not suffering from 
any illness or disease at the time a decision had to be made about treatment. The 
directive binds a health professional to the extent that it would be unlawful for that 
professional to provide the treatment that has been refused. 
As described previously, the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) imposes 
certain validity and formality requirements for a direction to be recognised as an 
AHD under the legislation. In addition, as listed above, the Act imposes significant 
restrictions about when an AHD about withholding and withdrawing a 
life-sustaining measure can operate that do not exist at common law. The practical 
implications of these limitations are considerable as they severely restrict the 
ability of many adults to plan for their future health treatment. For example, an 
adult who has been diagnosed with dementia may wish to complete an AHD in 
which he or she directs that all life-sustaining measures be withheld or withdrawn 
once the disease has progressed to the stage where the adult is no longer able to 
make health decisions. If that adult lost his or her decision-making capacity and 
then suffered a heart attack, it is unlikely that the AHD would operate. Given the 
nature of the disease, the adult would probably not be sufficiently ill for the 
purpose of the legislation.74 The decision about treatment would have to be made 
by someone else on the adult’s behalf. In such a case, the adult’s directive 
becomes one of only a number of factors that is considered in deciding on 
treatment.  
The Queensland legislation weighs principles of self-determination and the 
sanctity of life differently from the common law. While the common law 
recognises the tension between the principles, in the context of making an advance 
direction about treatment, the principle of self-determination prevails. In 
Queensland, this principle only prevails if the adult is sufficiently ill and, in some 
                                                          
74  A person with such a condition may not be expected to die within a year, is not in a persistent 
vegetative state or permanently unconscious, and may not be so ill that the person could not live 
without the continued provision of the life-sustaining measures: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) s 36(2)(a). 
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cases, where the directive is consistent with notions of good medical practice. 
Queensland’s restrictions on when an AHD in the end-of-life context can operate 
significantly undermine self-determination. It is submitted that the common law 
approach is more consistent with accepted principles of autonomy and 
self-determination regarding a competent adult’s right to choose the medical 
treatment he or she wishes to receive or not to receive. The rationale underpinning 
the common law recognition of advance directives is that the right to 
self-determination should not be lost simply because the adult loses his or her 
decision-making ability. If the adult has made a decision about treatment prior to 
losing capacity, that decision will be binding on health professionals. The common 
law recognises the seriousness of such a position and there are a number of 
safeguards that apply. As observed earlier, the court needs to be convinced that the 
adult intended the directive to apply in the situation that arose, and the views 
expressed were held by the adult at the time capacity was lost. Thus, the way that 
the common law balances the principles of self-determination and autonomy with 
that of sanctity of life is arguably more appropriate in that the refusal of treatment 
is still subject to certain safeguards. This approach does not disadvantage a 
competent person who later loses capacity, yet it protects an adult who lacks 
competence from the unintended operation of an advance directive to withhold or 
withdraw treatment. 
B Comparison with other Australian Statutory Regimes 
The legislation that regulates directives about future health care in Victoria, South 
Australia, Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory (and that 
proposed in Western Australia) was considered earlier in the article. In all of these 
jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory (and Western Australia), the 
advance directive about a life-sustaining measure will only operate if the adult 
suffers from a particular condition at the time the directive is completed (Victoria), 
or the adult is sufficiently ill (South Australia and the Northern Territory). To this 
extent, there are similarities with the equivalent requirement in the Queensland 
legislation. 
Nevertheless, the statutes elsewhere in Australia differ from the Queensland 
regime in some significant ways. First, only in Queensland is the notion of ‘good 
medical practice’ ‘relevant’ to the operation of an advance directive. An AHD 
relating to withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition or hydration will only 
operate in Queensland if continuing or commencing such treatment is inconsistent 
with ‘good medical practice’.75 An advance refusal of treatment in other 
jurisdictions does not have to comply with objective assessments of ‘good medical 
practice’ before it can operate. 
                                                          
75  This term is defined in the legislation in the following way: good medical practice is good 
medical practice for the medical profession having regard to (a) the recognised medical standards, 
practices and procedures of the medical profession in Australia; and (b) the recognised ethical 
standards of the medical profession in Australia: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 5B. 
See also GAA sch 2 s 5B. 
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Secondly, other Australian statutes do not have the requirement that the adult 
must have no reasonable prospect of regaining capacity to make a decision before 
the directive can operate. In other jurisdictions, a directive will operate even if, for 
example, the incapacity of the adult is temporary, such as where an otherwise 
healthy adult has suffered a heart attack and, at the time a decision about treatment 
needs to be made, the adult is unable to do so. In contrast, an AHD about a 
life-sustaining measure will not operate in Queensland unless the adult has no 
reasonable prospect of regaining capacity for that decision. This condition will not 
be satisfied in the above example, where, the adult suffering a heart attack is likely 
to regain capacity once resuscitation has been provided.  
Thirdly, and most significantly, the other statutory regimes have a two-tier 
system of operation. An adult is able to make an advance directive at common law 
or, alternatively, rely on the statutory regime.76 The implications of this are 
significant. An advance directive about a life-sustaining measure that is not 
operative under the legislative regime, for example, because the adult is not 
sufficiently ill, should take effect as an advance directive at common law. The 
directive, therefore, will bind the health professionals. The Queensland legislation, 
however, removes the right that is available to an adult at common law to refuse a 
life-sustaining measure in advance. This right is replaced with a far more limited 
right to dictate when a life-sustaining measure can be withheld or withdrawn. The 
decision as to treatment will instead be made by a substitute decision-maker as set 
out in the legislation. To the extent that the common law is excluded by the 
statutory regime, an adult is at a disadvantage to his or her counterparts in all other 
Australian jurisdictions in terms of self-determination of future medical treatment. 
C Comparison with Queensland Substitute Decision-Making 
Regime 
If the adult has not completed an AHD (or has completed one that is not operative 
on the facts of a particular case), the decision about withholding or withdrawing 
treatment is made by someone on behalf of the adult. This person is commonly 
referred to as a substitute decision-maker. The substitute decision-maker will be 
the guardian for personal matters77 if one has been appointed by the Guardianship 
and Administration Tribunal,78 or an attorney who has been appointed by the adult 
under an enduring power of attorney for personal matters.79 In the absence of 
either of these appointments, the decision will be made by the person deemed by 
the Powers of Attorney Act 1988 (Qld) to be the adult’s statutory health attorney.80 
                                                          
76  See s IVC above. 
77  A ‘personal matter’ is defined to include ‘health care of the adult’: GAA sch 2 s 2. 
78  GAA s 66(3).   
79  GAA s 66(4). 
80  GAA s 66(5). Note also that consent to withholding or withdrawing of a life-sustaining measure 
may be given by the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal and that consent will take priority 
over any other consent: GAA s 66(3). The term ‘statutory health attorney’ is defined in s 63 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and is the first of the following who is ‘readily available and 
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In reality, in almost all cases, the decision-maker will be a relative or close friend 
of the adult.81  
To compare the substitute decision-making regime with that which applies to 
a direction in an adult’s AHD, it is necessary to consider how a substitute 
decision-maker is required to make a decision about the withholding or 
withdrawing a life-sustaining measure. The Powers of Attorney Act 1988 (Qld) 
and the GAA provide guidance for the substitute decision-maker about what to 
consider in making a decision about treatment. Schedule 1, in both Acts, sets out a 
number of principles that must inform these sorts of decisions. They are separated 
into ‘general principles’ and ‘health care principle’. General principles apply to all 
decisions made under the legislation, of which withholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining measures is just one, and so are necessarily broad. The health care 
principle is to be used for health related decisions only, which include decisions 
about withholding or withdrawing treatment. 
The Guardianship and Administration Tribunal has considered these 
principles in the context of withholding and withdrawing treatment on a number of 
occasions.82 In the most recent decision, Re HG,83 the Tribunal considered that the 
following principles are likely to be particularly relevant to a decision to withhold 
or withdraw life-sustaining measures: the right of all adults to the same basic 
human rights regardless of capacity;84 an adult’s right to respect for his or her 
human worth and dignity;85 the adult’s views and wishes, if they are known;86 and 
the health care principle which requires a consideration of whether the decision is 
‘least restrictive of the adult’s rights’87 and what is in the adult’s best interests.88  
It is interesting to compare the legislative restrictions governing a substitute 
decision-maker with those that affect directions in an AHD. The following 
example may facilitate the comparison. 
An adult has being diagnosed with cancer and is receiving chemotherapy. The 
adult is not regarded as being in the terminal phase of the disease and is expected 
to live for a number of years. The adult has made an AHD under which he has 
directed that he not receive antibiotics (or any other life-sustaining treatment) 
                                                                                                                                     
culturally appropriate’ to make the decision about health care: spouse of the adult, provided that 
the relationship is close and continuing; the adult’s carer, provided the person is 18 years or over 
and is not a paid carer of the adult; a close friend or relation of the adult who, again, must be 18 
or over and must also not be a paid carer; or the Adult Guardian. 
81  It should also be noted that although the decision about withholding or withdrawing a life-
sustaining measure can be made by a substitute decision-maker, the legislation effectively gives a 
right of veto to health professionals. A decision to withhold or withdraw treatment will not 
operate unless the adult’s health provider must reasonably consider that the commencement or 
continuation of the measure is inconsistent with good medical practice: GAA s 66A. 
82 Re HG [2006] QGAAT 26, Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1 and Re RWG 
[2000] QGAAT 2. 
83 [2006] QGAAT 26. 
84  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 1 general principle 2(1). 
85  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 1 general principle 3. 
86  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 1 general principle 7. 
87  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 1 health care principle 12(1)(a). 
88  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 1 health care principle 12(1)(b)(ii).  
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even if such treatment is needed to save his life. The adult develops a serious 
infection and is admitted to hospital. He lapses into unconsciousness and a 
decision must be made about treatment. 
It is unlikely that the directive in the AHD would operate because the adult is 
unlikely to satisfy the condition that he was sufficiently ill.89 Further, if the adult 
were given the treatment (antibiotics), he would have a reasonable prospect of 
regaining capacity for health matters.90 
The same restrictions do not apply if the decision is made by a substitute 
decision-maker. A decision not to administer antibiotics can be made even though 
the adult does not fall within one of the categories relevant to the operation of an 
AHD and even though he has a reasonable prospect of recovering capacity for 
health decisions if the treatment was given. Instead, the decision-maker would be 
required to apply the general principles and health care principle, including a 
consideration of the adult’s views and wishes91 and the adult’s dignity.92 In 
addition, health care principle 12(4) specifically states that the principle does not 
affect any right an adult has to refuse health care. Although this provision has not 
yet been tested, it appears to reinforce the principle that a person is able to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment. This would be particularly relevant in a case where the 
adult has indicated a desire not to be resuscitated.  
This comparison illustrates the fact that fewer restrictions are imposed on a 
substitute decision-maker who wants to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining 
measure for someone else, than on the adult himself or herself who seeks to do so 
through an AHD.93 This result is anomalous because the legislation imposes more 
restrictions on an adult attempting to direct his or own future treatment through an 
AHD than on a substitute decision-maker who makes the decision on behalf of 
someone else.  
D Favoured Status of Some Individuals under the Queensland 
Regime 
The Queensland legislation defines ‘life-sustaining measure’ as follows:94 
(1) A ‘life-sustaining measure’ is health care intended to sustain or prolong 
life and that supplants or maintains the operation of vital bodily 
functions that are temporarily or permanently incapable of independent 
operation. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), each of the following is a ‘life-
sustaining measure’— 
(a) cardiopulmonary resuscitation; 
                                                          
89  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2)(a).  
90  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2)(c). 
91  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 1 general principle 7(4). 
92  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 1 general principle 3. 
93  Note, however, the health professional’s right of veto. See above n 81. 
94  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and GAA sch 2 s 5A. 
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(b)  assisted ventilation; 
(c)  artificial nutrition and hydration. 
(3) A blood transfusion is not a ‘life-sustaining measure’. 
With one significant exception, the definition is comparable to that used in other 
jurisdictions. What is peculiar to Queensland, is the exclusion of ‘blood 
transfusion’ from the definition. From a medical perspective, such an exclusion is 
surprising because a blood transfusion is a medical procedure that could ‘sustain 
or prolong life’ and that would ‘supplant or maintain the operation of vital bodily 
functions that are temporarily or permanently incapable of independent operation’ 
to the same extent as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, assisted ventilation or 
artificial nutrition and hydration. 
There are various reasons why an adult may not wish to receive life-sustaining 
medical treatment and may wish that decision to apply to future events as well. 
The following are some contexts in which an adult may make such a decision and 
complete an AHD directing life-sustaining measures to be withheld or withdrawn: 
Example 1 
Alex wants to have some control over the timing of his death. He is 80 years old 
and has lived a full and fulfilling life, and is ready to die if an acute event occurs. 
Despite being in good health, he does not want to be resuscitated in such a 
situation. 
Example 2 
Wendy is 45 and has just been diagnosed with early onset dementia. At this stage 
of her disease, she still has capacity to make health decisions. Wendy has 
researched the disease, discussed the likely progress of the disease with her doctor 
and wants to have some control over the manner of her death. She would rather die 
from an acute event rather than experience a gradual deterioration of her health.  
Example 3 
Shane is of the Christian Science faith. He believes that prayer will heal any illness 
that he might suffer and does not want to receive any medical intervention in any 
circumstances.  
Example 4 
Danielle is a Jehovah’s Witness. Because of her faith, she does not wish to receive 
blood products in any circumstances.  
Assume that in all of these examples, the adult has been involved in a car 
accident. In the first three cases, the adult has suffered a heart attack and needs 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation to survive. In the fourth case, the adult has lost a lot 
of blood and needs a blood transfusion to survive. 
In all of these examples, the adult does not satisfy the criteria set out in the 
Queensland legislation regarding when a direction to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment can operate. None of them suffers from a terminal illness with the 
expectation of death within 12 months, is in a persistent vegetative state, is 
permanently unconscious or has an illness or injury of such severity that there is 
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no reasonable prospect that the adult will recover to an extent that life-sustaining 
measures will not be needed. As a result, in examples 1, 2 and 3, the AHD 
refusing treatment cannot operate and the decision regarding treatment will be 
made by a substitute decision-maker.95 However, the AHD in example 4 will 
operate. Because the definition of ‘life-sustaining measure’ in the legislation 
excludes a blood transfusion, the restrictions set out in the legislation about when 
an AHD about withholding or withdrawing treatment can operate, do not apply. 
A Jehovah’s Witness therefore can give a direction to refuse a blood transfusion in 
an AHD that will operate in the future, yet other adults are more restricted in terms 
of when an AHD about a life-sustaining measure must be followed. 
It is not clear why blood transfusions are excluded from the definition of 
‘life-sustaining measure’. They were not excluded when the Powers of Attorney 
Act 1998 (Qld) was originally enacted. This exception was inserted by the GAA. 
Unfortunately, the explanatory memorandum to the Bill and the debate in 
Parliament do not provide an explanation for this decision. Regardless of the 
motive for the amendment, the exclusion of blood transfusion from the definition 
accommodates people of the Jehovah’s Witness faith. Such individuals have 
religious objection to receiving blood transfusions and, understandably, may want 
to complete an AHD directing that such treatment not be administered. 
The problem with the current drafting is that those who refuse a blood 
transfusion that is needed to save their lives can insist on their direction being 
followed, yet those seeking to refuse other kind of life-sustaining medical 
treatment (as in examples 1–3 above) cannot. The current drafting can be criticised 
at two levels. First, providing greater respect to the autonomy of one group of 
individuals over another cannot be justified. In a secular society, it is not 
appropriate to respect the decision about medical treatment made by one group in 
our community because failure to do so offends their religious belief, yet fail to 
respect the views that others may make about future medical treatment because the 
decision is based on other grounds. Secondly, it appears that the legislation 
discriminates between different kinds of religious faith. Those of the ‘Christian 
Science’ faith, for example, may not want medical treatment as they believe they 
will be healed through the power of prayer. Those of the Jehovah’s Witness faith 
regard blood transfusions to be forbidden by biblical passages.96 There can be no 
principled reason for accommodating the faith-driven needs and wishes of one 
group and not another.  
E Comparison with Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority (‘Gillick’): The Competent Child 
A minor should not have greater rights than an adult to refuse future medical 
treatment. Yet this might represent the legal position in some of the statutory 
                                                          
95  In the case of urgent health care, the treatment decision will be made by the health professional: 
GAA s 63.  
96  http://www.watchtower.org/library/hb/article_06.htm [last accessed 7 December 2006]. 
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jurisdictions, including Queensland. The Queensland legislation does not permit 
minors to complete an AHD; only an adult is able to give directions about future 
treatment through an AHD.97 Consent to and refusal of medical treatment for 
minors in Queensland will, therefore, be governed by common law principles.98 
The Australian common law in this area is not settled, but it is at least arguable 
that a child with the requisite competence can give an advance directive to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. This argument is based on 
the principle, accepted by the High Court, that a competent minor can consent to 
his or her medical treatment. 
In Gillick99 the House of Lords held that a minor is capable of giving informed 
consent if he or she ‘achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable 
him or her to understand fully what is proposed’.100 The degree of understanding 
and intelligence required in a particular case will depend on the seriousness and 
complexity of the medical treatment being considered. As is the case for an adult, 
the degree of capacity required for a decision to withhold life-sustaining treatment 
would be higher than capacity to consent to a medical examination for a trivial 
injury.101 If the minor is competent to consent to treatment, then a health 
professional may lawfully treat the child even if the parents oppose the treatment. 
These legal propositions now form part of the common law of Australia102 and, 
therefore, represent the Queensland law on consent to medical treatment by 
minors. 
Applying the principle set out in Gillick’s case, it should follow that if a child 
has sufficient understanding and intelligence, he or she should be able to give a 
valid refusal of treatment, even if that treatment is necessary to save his or her life. 
However, the English courts that have considered the refusal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment by a minor have indicated that such refusal could be overridden 
by either the minor’s parents or the court consenting to treatment. The English 
decisions have been based on one of two grounds. First, that the minor could not 
be regarded as Gillick competent.103 Most decisions have been decided on this 
basis and those decisions underscore the high level of capacity that would be 
required before a minor would be regarded as Gillick competent in the context of 
                                                          
97  Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 35(1). 
98  This reflects the case in most Australian jurisdictions. Compare Minors (Property and Contracts) 
Act 1970 NSW s 49(2) and Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 6 
which regulate consent to treatment. 
99 Gillick [1986] AC 112. 
100  Ibid 189.  
101  In Gillick, for example, Lord Fraser commented that it would be ‘verging on the absurd to suggest 
that a girl or a boy aged 15 could not effectively consent, for example, to have a medical 
examination of some trivial injury to [her or] his body or even to have a broken arm set’: [1986] 
AC 112, 169. 
102  Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) 
(1991) 175 CLR 218, 239. 
103  Re R (a minor) (wardship: consent to treatment) [1992] Fam 11; Re E (a minor) [1993] 1 FLR 
386; Re S (a minor) (consent to medical treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065; Re L (medical treatment: 
Gillick competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810; Re M (medical treatment: consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097; 
Re K, W and H (minors) (consent to treatment) [1993] 1 FCR 240. 
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refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. Secondly, even if the minor is regarded 
as being Gillick competent, the courts have allowed parental or court consent to 
override the minor’s refusal on the basis of the treatment being in the minor’s ‘best 
interests’.104  
The approach taken by the English courts in allowing a competent minor’s 
refusal to be overridden by parents or by court order has been resoundingly 
criticised as being contrary to the principles set out in Gillick’s case. Some 
commentators suggest that if a minor has the understanding and intelligence to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment, he or she should be in the same legal position as 
an adult.105 It should not be possible for that refusal to be overridden by a parent or 
court. 
There is very little primary authority on this point in Australia. In Secretary, 
Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (‘Marion’s 
case’), McHugh J expressed the view that ‘the parent’s authority is at an end when 
the child gains sufficient intellectual and emotional maturity to make an informed 
decision on the matter in question’.106 He then cited an English case which 
involved a minor’s refusal of treatment being overridden by a court,107 and 
commented that, to the extent that this case ‘suggests the contrary, it is 
inconsistent with Gillick’.108  
In Director General, New South Wales Department of Community 
Services v Y,109 the issue of refusal of treatment by a minor was considered by the 
New South Wales Supreme Court. Austin J cited, with approval, a number of 
English decisions which permitted treatment contrary to the expressed wishes of 
the child, although on the facts of the case, the minor was held not to be competent 
to decide her own medical treatment. 
Finally, the issue of refusal of treatment by a competent minor was 
mentioned, but not decided, by the Family Court in Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment 
for Gender Identity Dysphoria,110 a case involving a 13 year old child who wished 
to undergo sex change treatment. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission contended that:  
                                                          
104 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627.  Further support for the right of the 
court or parent to override a Gillick competent minor’s refusal of treatment can be found in the 
following cases: Re R (a minor) (wardship: consent to treatment) [1992] Fam 11; Re S (a minor) 
(consent to medical treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065; Re L (medical treatment: Gillick competency) 
[1998] 2 FLR 810; Re K, W and H (minors) (consent to treatment) [1993] 1 FCR 240. 
105  See, for example, Andrew Hockton, The Law of Consent to Medical Treatment (2002) 78-84 and 
Leanne Bunney, ‘The Capacity of competent Minors to consent to and Refuse Medical 
Treatment’ (1995) 5 Journal of Law and Medicine 53. See also concerns expressed by John 
Eekelaar in ‘The Eclipse of Parental Rights’ (1986) 102 Law Quarterly Review 4 and Andrew 
Bainham in ‘The Judge and the Competent Minor’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 194. 
106  Marion’s case (1991) 175 CLR 218, 316. 
107  Re R (a minor) (wardship: consent to treatment) [1992] Fam 11. 
108  Ibid 317. Although McHugh J dissented in this case, his comments about the application of 
Gillick’s case to refusal of treatment by a competent minor was not the basis of his dissent. 
109  [1999] NSWSC 644. 
110 [2004] FamCA 297. 
10 FJLR ?] LINDY WILLMOTT 
27 
[A] court has no power to override either the informed consent or informed 
refusal of a competent minor to medical treatment, or, if it does have such a 
power, it should not as a matter of discretion exercise that power except, perhaps, 
in extreme circumstances (emphasis added).  
Nicholson CJ expressed doubt about the correctness of that proposition but found 
it unnecessary to decide the matter on the facts of the case because the child was 
held not to be Gillick competent.111 
The common law position in Australia, therefore, must still be regarded as 
inconclusive. However, if Australian courts adopt the Gillick principle in the 
context of a minor refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, then it should also 
follow that a minor could refuse treatment in advance of the medical situation 
arising. Although it is unlikely to be a frequent occurrence, there may be occasions 
when a minor wishes to make an advance directive to refuse life-sustaining 
medical treatment. One such case may be where a child has suffered from 
leukemia since early childhood and has undergone invasive treatment for most of 
his or her life. At 16, the child may decide that he or she does not wish to be 
resuscitated should an acute event occur at some time in the future and a 
life-sustaining measure is needed to keep him or her alive. If the child 
subsequently lapses into unconsciousness, a decision about the validity of his or 
her advance directive would need to be made. If Gillick is followed in Australia in 
the context of refusing treatment, then a Gillick competent child’s advance 
directive should be binding on health professionals and treatment could not be 
given contrary to that directive. 
If the legal position, just described, represents the common law in relation to 
competent minors, it sits uncomfortably with the legal regime that applies to 
competent adults in Queensland who complete an AHD about refusing 
life-sustaining medical treatment. While an adult’s AHD can only operate in 
limited circumstances, no such restrictions would apply to the advance directive of 
a competent minor.  
VI CONCLUSION 
A competent adult’s right to make his or her own decision about medical treatment 
is well entrenched in our legal system. Provided the adult is competent to make the 
decision, it is irrelevant that the decision may be contrary to notions of good 
medical practice. At common law, this right extends to making decisions about 
treatment in advance of the medical situation arising. Again, the right is an integral 
                                                          
111  In Royal Alexandra Hospital v Joseph [2005] NSWSC 422 per Gzell J and [2005] NSWSC 465 
per Einstein J, it was held that it was within the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
order that a 16 year old child be given a blood transfusion notwithstanding the child’s objection. 
However, there was no discussion in the judgment about whether the child was competent to 
make the refusal.  
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part of an adult’s right to self-determination and is consistent with principles of 
personal autonomy. Review of existing laws is currently, or has recently been, on 
the agenda of governments in many Australian jurisdictions. As part of that 
review, governments must consider whether legislation should be enacted, or 
whether the common law should continue to regulate individual rights in this area. 
There are some important advantages to having a legislative regime which have 
been rehearsed in this article. The enactment of legislation, however, will, of 
necessity, impose restrictions on an individual’s right to refuse future treatment.  
When considering the appropriate legal regime to govern advance directives, 
governments would do well to learn from the Queensland experience. The motive 
for Queensland’s legislative restrictions may have been a political response to 
pressures exerted by influential lobby groups. There needs to be a more principled 
basis than this for restricting an individual’s right to refuse their future treatment. 
What can be the justification for restricting the operation of advance directives 
about life-sustaining measures? Is it because, as a society, we feel comfortable 
about withholding or withdrawing treatment in some circumstances, but not in 
others? Should an adult in the terminal phase of a terminal illness be permitted to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment, but not someone who has a severe and debilitating 
illness which is not terminal? Is it the case that personal autonomy is acceptable, 
but only if it is exercised to the extent that we, as a society, feel comfortable? If 
this is the reason that restrictions are being imposed, governments are taking an 
unprincipled and dangerous step in restricting individual rights. 
Establishing a legal regime about advance directives is a process fraught with 
difficulty. It requires governments to balance competing principles of personal 
autonomy with societal and state interests in preserving life and, in the legal 
context, will have significant political implications. As the Queensland experience 
illustrates, lobby groups can influence outcomes. However, the views expressed by 
such influential groups may not necessarily, and indeed are unlikely to be, 
representative of the majority of the public. Governments must undertake any 
review in a principled way. Without legislative intervention, individuals enjoy an 
almost unfettered common law right to decide not to receive treatment at a future 
time. Governments must think very carefully before eroding those rights.  
